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ABSTRACT 
Justin Chandler Wilcox: A Mirror Image of the Eurozone Balance of Payments Problem: Using 
Theories of Institutionalism to Explore the International Monetary Fund’s Policy Paradigm Shift 
due to Germany’s Current Account Surplus 
(Under the direction of Liesbet Hooghe) 
 
 This paper serves as an exploratory look into how Germany's current account surplus 
triggered a policy paradigm shift in institutional response to the persistent imbalance of 
payments problem during the eurozone crisis.  It creates a narrative of how Germany’s current 
account balance came into political focus and why international institutions, in particular the 
International Monetary Fund, shifted policies away from placing the burden of financial 
rebalancing on debtor countries toward a more equal policy of assigning some blame to creditor 
countries.  The paper makes use of the concept of policy paradigm shifts and how these changes 
can occur within international institutions.  It also discusses the measure of the current account 
and later argues that the burden of financial rebalancing is unfairly applied to only Germany, 
rather that the blame and burden is better assigned more widely to the North of Europe which 
also has high current account surpluses.
 iv 
To Johanna, who listened to these ideas far longer than she should have, and who 
showed me the countries on this continent are more than the sum of their parts.
 v 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Global financial governance is a concept which seems too far removed from mainstream 
politics to garner much attention, just as the concept of European financial governance stirs  the 
pejorative loss of nation-state sovereignty, bail-outs, and austerity measures.  But such ideas are 
not as far from the mainstream in recent history, especially since the eurozone crisis of 2009.  
The frequency of the word combination “governance” and “financial markets” has increased in 
media six times since 2008 as compared to before.  To what degree are sovereign nation-states 
accountable to one another in the world economy?  To what degree are they accountable to one 
another in terms of global balance of payments?1 
This paper serves as an exploratory look into how Germany's current account surplus has 
triggered a paradigm shift in institutional response to the persistent imbalance of payments 
problem during the eurozone crisis.  It will create a narrative of how Germany’s current account 
balance came into political focus and why international institutions, in particular the 
International Monetary Fund, shifted policies regarding creditor and debtor countries.  It will 
look at how these institutions shifted away from placing the burden of financial rebalancing on 
debtor countries toward a more equal policy of assigning some blame to creditor countries, 
namely Germany, and how this, in turn, affects Germany’s position in the Eurozone.  The paper 
makes use of the concept of policy paradigms and policy paradigm shifts and how these changes 
can occur within international institutions.  It also discusses the importance of the current 
                                                
1Henrik Enderlein.  “Global Governance der internationalen Finanzmärkte” in Politik und Zeitgeschichte.  
Bundeszentralamt für politische Bildung, 2009. 
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account as a measure of balance of payments and later argues that the burden of financial 
rebalancing is unfairly applied to only Germany, rather that the blame and burden is better 
assigned more widely to the North of Europe which also has high current account surpluses. 
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II. POLICY PARADIGMS AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT 
A policy paradigm is not only the product of a single actor, but the product of pluralist 
interests in democratic discourse.  According to Peter Hall, organized interests, especially 
political parties, influence the policy paradigm even when they are not in government by 
challenging current policy and promoting their own policies which, when past policy is taken 
into account, creates the path-dependent pattern of policies called policy paradigms. 2  To 
borrow the adage, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.  While an individual policy can 
be studied in and of its own merit, a policy paradigm is a series of related policies which can 
have, for example, common long-term goals or some other form of consistency.  These policy 
paradigms are quite often path dependent, aggregating and complementing one another as time 
progresses.  Because of the factor of time, a path dependent policy paradigm is more difficult to 
break with the longer the paradigm has been established.  It becomes the status quo—the 
starting point from which new policies must be measured.  Using the concept of policy 
paradigms, this paper will look at the policy shift which occurred among international actors in 
2013 in regard to the eurozone’s balance of payments problem during the financial crisis. 
Another important concept for this paper is the balance of payments measure called the 
current account.  According to International Monetary Fund standards, the current account is a 
balance of payments measure comprised essentially of a country’s exports minus imports, plus 
income earned outside of the country as well as transfers of money by private citizens back into 
                                                
2 Peter Hall. “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in 
Britain” in Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, April 1993. 
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the country, such as remittances.3   The measure has the importance of representing the overall 
money coming in to a country.  What is ‘current’ about the current account is that it is more a 
measure of liquid capital.  The other balance of payments measure, called the capital account, is 
a measure of the change in illiquid assets during a certain time period, measuring how much of a 
country is owned by outside investors or how much investors in a country own of another 
country.  The current account and the capital account together make up the balance of 
payments.  This paper will focus on Germany’s current account surplus because of its 
significance in the mid 2013 IMF policy paradigm shift.
                                                
3Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual”. International Monetary Fund.  
Sixth Edition.  2008. 
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III. THE PRE-CRISIS POLICY PARADIGM AND THE EURO 
This section summarizes the policy paradigm in the eurozone before the 2013 shift.  It 
first takes a historical look at the necessity and creation of the eurozone by going back to the 
Maastricht Treaty.  It also shows that the lack of fiscal integration at the European level was 
made up for by the enshrinement of hard German monetarist principles into European-level 
institutions.  Finally, this section explores the creation of the International Monetary Fund in 
the Bretton Woods System and the development of its competencies an international institution.  
History of the Eurozone 
The difference between monetary and fiscal policy, as well as these policy’s varying 
degrees of implementation on the EU level, is an important distinction in the logic of this paper.  
Firstly, monetary policy was permanently institutionalized across participating EU member 
states by the Maastricht Treaty.  This created the eurozone, but it was not the first time that EU 
member states coordinated monetary policy.  The EU undertook economic and monetary union 
because of the problems associated with fluctuating exchange rates, creating problems for 
businesses, individuals, and even the EU as a centralized economic entity.  Coordination of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), developed very early on into the EU’s existence, is one such 
example of the difficulties that multiple currencies caused the EU in its early years.4   To tackle 
such exchange rate problems, a common monetary policy was needed.  But fiscal integration 
was not added to the monetary integration.  The German Bundesbank’s tough 
                                                
4Barry Eichengreen.  Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System. ebook. Ch. 
“After the Bretton Woods System: Floating Exchange Rates in the 1970s”. Princeton University Press, 
2008.   
  
 6 
monetarist approach was embedded in the Maastricht Treaty and is institutionalized at the EU 
level in the form of the European Central Bank.5   The ECB’s original mandate of price stability 
and low-levels of inflation were paramount while unemployment rate reduction was not made a 
priority.  Erik Jones’ summary of the Maastricht Treaty’s convergence criteria takes five points 
required by each member state: 
1. enactment of legislation ensuring the independence of the member state’s central bank 
from political pressure; 
2. participation in the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary System 
without the realignment of currency or experiencing unusual volatility for two years; 
3. fiscal deficit of 3 percent or lower, or to show evidence that the deficit will be as such, 
and that public debts are below 60 percent of GDP, or are declining to such levels; 
4. inflation rate within 1.5 percentage points of the “three best performers in terms of 
price inflation” 
5. long-term interest rates within 2 percentage points of the “three best performers in 
terms of price inflation”.6  
Many of these criteria were modeled after the German Bundesbank and its tough approach to 
curb inflation.  But all of these criteria were not met by the member states.  The third point, 
providing for the guidelines for the prescribed fiscal deficit and amount of public debt, was 
enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact which brought oversight and enforcement 
mechanisms to these criteria when the members were already participating in the Eurozone. 
 The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) in 1997 imposed a “political and legal obligation” on 
eurozone members to participate in a peer review system of budget surveillance, serving as a 
sort of ersatz-fiscal union.  While a French proposal once suggested an ‘economic government’ 
                                                
5Philip Arestis and Georgios Chortareas.  “Monetary Policy in the Euro Area” in Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics, Vol. 28, No. 3. 2006. 
 
6 Erik Jones. “European Economy and Economic Governance” in Europe Today, Third Edition.  Ronald 
Tiersky and Erik Jones, eds.  Rowman and Littlefield, 2007: 299. 
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to serve instead of a true fiscal union, the Maastricht Treaty and the SGP ultimately included a 
‘no bail-out clause’ which removed obligation from eurozone countries to bail out one another.7   
The SGP and the Maastricht Treaty are policed by the finance ministers of the member states 
(Ecofin) and are also monitored by the European Commission, which can impose sanctions on 
the offending member state.8   As is evident because of the financial crisis, the Maastricht 
Treaty’s commitment to creating economic and monetary union was insufficient in creating a 
eurozone strong enough to weather balance of payments crises.  The financial crisis pushed the 
EU more in the direction of fiscal coordination, but still resulted in the EU’s rather characteristic 
informal coordination and flexibility in regard to fiscal matters.9   Although the impetus for 
fiscal union existed at one point in the discourse of EMU, steps toward it have not been pursued 
very hard by EU member states. 
History of the International Monetary Fund 
On the global stage, the International Monetary Fund was created in 1944 as part of the 
Bretton Woods system in order to achieve global exchange rate stability.  Barry Eichengreen 
explains that the Bretton Woods system “dispatched with payments problems, permitting the 
unprecedented expansion of international trade and investment that fueled the postwar 
boom.”10   He goes on to emphasize that the Bretton Woods system was part of the Washington 
Consensus, the United States-favored agreement in post-WWII international finance and 
economics.  The IMF played was very integral role in that postwar order, providing stability to 
                                                
7Amy Verdun.  “The EU and the Global Political Economy” in International Relations and the European 
Union,  Second Edition.  Christopher Hill and Michael Smith, eds.  Oxford University Press, 2008, pp. 
256-7. 
 
8Desmond Dinan.  Ever Closer Union.  Fourth Edition.  Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010: 402. 
 
9Daniela Schwarzer. “Zehn Jahre Governance der Eurozone : ökonomische Bilanz und institutionelle 
Dynamiken jenseits der Vertragsrevisionen” in Integration: Vierteljahreszeitschrift des Instituts für 
Europäische Politik in Zusammenarbeit mit dem Arbeitskreis Europäische Integration, Vol. 32, No. 1, 
2009, pp. 26-9. 
 
10Eichengreen. 2008. ebook Ch. “The Bretton Woods System”. 
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international exchange rates due to its power to “sanction governments responsible for policies 
that destabilize the international system and compensate countries that were adversely 
affected”.11  But Eichengreen is in part incorrect in this last sentence.  The IMF has not always 
sanctioned countries which disrupt international balance of payments, rather it has sanctioned 
debtor countries rather than creditor countries simply because of  
a) the perception that debtor countries are those countries which disrupt international 
balance of payments, and  
b) debtor countries are usually the only countries which apply for IMF funding, through 
which the IMF can use its conditionality powers to influence policy change. 
These points are elaborated further in the following section.  But the changing nature of the 
IMF, especially the competencies it has given itself since its founding, should not be ignored.  At 
its founding, the IMF had fewer competencies than it has today.  Michael Barnett and Martha 
Finnemore write that “today’s International Monetary Fund is not the organization anticipated 
by the states at its founding in 1944”.12   The changing nature and expanding competencies of the 
IMF are examined in further detail in the following subsection. 
 
The Autonomy of International Institutions 
There are two views on international institutions.  One view is that international 
institutions serve the common needs of their member countries and are products of state 
agreements, meaning that the aligned interests create the institution to increase efficiency.  The 
second view is that international institutions can develop policies of their own, and this may 
leave room for inefficiency as is true with any large-scale organization-- bureaucracy or 
                                                
11Eichengreen. 2008. ebook Ch. “The Bretton Woods System”. 
 
12Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global 
Politics.  Cornell University Press, 2004, p. 45. 
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corporate actor.  These distinctions will provide a good starting point in determining the original 
intent and the current practices of the IMF. 
Prominent state-centric/realist theories of international institutionalism owe a great deal 
to John J. Mearsheimer.  In his 1994 paper “The False Promise of International Institutions”, 
Mearsheimer distinguishes between realists and institutionalists, writing that realists see 
institutions on the sidelines while state actors affect international affairs. 13  If institutions do 
anything, in the realist view, it is minimal in comparison to state actors.  Institutionalists, 
Mearsheimer writes, vary in their conceptualizations and degrees in which institutions aid state 
actors in cooperation with the end goal of peace.  But what is common to these theories of 
institutionalism is an assumption of their significance in international affairs.  Mearsheimer 
finds this assumption to be false, and that the promulgation of institutionalist theories to be a 
paradox because of their optimistic fashion even without supporting evidence to their validity. 
Retorting Mearsheimer’s state-centric theories were Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin 
who, in their 1995 article “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory”, champion the effects of 
international institutions in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.14   Mearsheimer, they 
write, predicted the weakening of NATO and the European Community following the end of the 
Cold War.  Keohane and Martin write that Mearsheimer “could have added that [governments] 
invest material and reputational resources in NATO, the EU, and also in organizations such as 
GATT [(now the World Trade Orgnization)], and NAFTA”. 15  What Keohane and Martin show is 
that state actors are institutionalists themselves, promoting common interests at the 
international level to manage expectations from other governments and eliminate or downplay 
                                                
13John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions” in International Security, Vol. 
19, No. 3 (Winter, 1994-1995), p. 47. 
 
14Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin.  “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory” in International 
Security, Vol. 20, No. 5 (Summer 1995), pp. 39-51. 
 
15Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, 1995. pp. 39-51. 
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informational asymmetries in global affairs.  While Mearsheimer focused primarily on state 
motivations such as survival and security, Keohane and Martin show that when survival needs 
are met, states use international institutions very regularly to meet long-term and wide-reaching 
policy goals. 
Barnett and Finnemore discuss the shortcomings of the state-centric theory of 
international institution creation by explaining the “power of [international organizations] and 
their propensity for dysfunctional, even pathological, behavior.”16   They note that the realist 
perspective assumes that states create international institutions in areas in which there is 
inefficiency in policy coordination in which mutual gains can be made and Pareto optimality 
achieved.  This sort of approach to explaining why and in which policy area international 
institutions are formed by states can be compared to economists’ theories on why firms appear.  
Rather than customers in cities conducting business directly with farms, for example, 
supermarkets are formed to create more efficiency in the agricultural/food industry.  This same 
principle is applied to the creation of international institutions in areas in which states agree to 
common, general policy goals, meaning at minimum a base level of agreement that continued 
cooperation will increase the welfare for states involved. 
Barnett and Finnemore criticize this view, writing that “mainstream approaches in 
political science that are informed by economic theories have tended to locate agency in the 
states that comprise [international organization] membership and treat [international 
organizations] as mere arenas in which states pursue their policies”.17   After creation, they write, 
there is little attention to subsequent developments within the institutions in respect to how 
                                                
16Michael N. Barnett and and Martha Finnemore.  “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations” in International Organizations, Vol. 53 No. 4 (Autumn 1999) p. 699. 
 
17Michael N. Barnett and and Martha Finnemore.  “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations” 1999. p. 726. 
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their day-to-day functioning morphs from the intended mandate of their state creators and their 
actual effects. 
Instead of relying so heavily on the realist approach, Barnett and Finnemore argue that 
international institutions gain autonomy and different competencies as they change and develop 
a sort of sentience on their own.  They argue that treating international institutions as their own 
independent actors is a better approach than assuming they are always serving their member 
states’ interests.18   While inter-state bargaining is the cause of these institutions’ creations, an 
institutional autonomy develops.  This is especially true at the IMF because of its budgetary 
structure and its expertise in its competencies which gives its staff agenda setting power.  The 
IMF is not funded by annual state allocations, rather staff salaries and other operating costs are 
paid for by the interest it collects on loans to member states.19   These factors contribute highly 
to the IMF’s gains in autonomy. 
The unique history and organization of the IMF accounts for its rather high level of 
autonomy from its member state founders.  By assessing the institution’s changing 
competencies in comparison to its original mandate, the IMF can be seen as an autonomous 
actor in and of itself.  Barnett and Finnemore argue that changes made at the IMF cannot be 
attributed to new demands by the states, but that the IMF actively created its own policy goals 
and helped to set its own agenda.  Many of the staff experts at the IMF, they write, drove many 
developments solely because of their expertise in economics.  The changing of the institution’s 
competencies undertaken by the IMF itself were in response not to the institution’s success, the 
authors write, “but because of [the IMF’s] persistent failure to stabilize the economies of the 
                                                
18Barnett and Finnemore, “The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International Organizations” in 
International Organizations, 1999. p. 704. 
 
19Barnett and Finnemore. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. 2004, p. 
49-50. 
 
  
 12 
member states.”20   The IMF’s original competencies were much more limited than they are 
today; had these original competencies sufficed to stabilize exchange rates and alleviate balance 
of payments problems, it would have had little reason to expand the tools it used to achieve 
those goals.  The ever-expanding competencies of the IMF lead to the argument that the 
institution is a decision-making actor autonomous of state control. 
                                                
20Barnett and Finnemore. Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics. 2004, p. 
49-50. 
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IV. A POLICY PARADIGM SHIFT IN CRISIS RESPONSE 
 There occurred in the last half of 2013 a paradigm shift in how international actors and 
institutions saw Germany’s position in the eurozone crisis. These international institutions 
could be said to have allied themselves with the economic policies of the German government, 
promoting its example to the periphery economies.  This was the paradigm.  But Germany found 
itself on the opposing end of the accuser/accused dichotomy in 2013 when the issue of its 
current account surplus was raised.  Germany is now no longer seen as the austere model to 
follow, and its requirements of austerity measures in periphery countries have lost their 
traditional support from the IMF. 
This policy paradigm shift can be described as a Third Order Change, according to a 
rubric laid out by Peter Hall in an article on the economic reforms of Britain’s conservative 
government in 1979.  First and Second Order Changes deal with policy changes that still follow 
the paradigm, that is the pattern or policy legacy, and are therefore not such radical changes.21   
But a Third Order Change is in essence a more marked upheaval in policy change that is unique 
and requires a more in-depth look.  Hall writes that Third Order Changes, while still policy 
changes that use new tools because of dissatisfaction with older policies, are so markedly 
different in that they disregard policy legacies by completely changing the goals of the original 
policy changes in the first place.  Applied to the situation with Germany in 2013: Germany and 
its favored austerity measures were promoted to the crisis periphery, then there was a policy 
                                                
21Peter Hall. “Policy Paradigms, Social Learning, and the State: The Case of Economic Policymaking in 
Britain” in Comparative Politics, Vol. 25, No. 3, April 1993, p. 281-4. 
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change.  Although eurozone recovery is still the ultimate policy goal, austerity measures have 
thus far proved to be insufficiently satisfactory in crisis resolution.  Instead of forcing austerity 
measures on crisis countries and promoting the interests of creditor countries (like Germany), 
the IMF broke with this policy legacy and began criticizing Germany’s high current account 
surplus as a major source of hindrance to eurozone recovery. 
The IMF itself has admitted to the policy change, citing mismanagement in its response 
to the bailout of Greece which led to the now European-wide sovereign debt crisis.  An internal 
policy communication was cited by multiple news organizations as saying that the IMF had 
“badly underestimated the damage that its prescriptions of austerity would do to Greece’s 
economy”.22   The IMF document also said that the institution’s own criteria for aid qualification 
was manipulated so that Greece could receive loans, as Greece failed on 3 out of 4 of the main 
criteria to qualify for aid.  The criteria manipulation was defended by the IMF as a way to 
alleviate the short-term shock of the Greek debt crisis so that its effects on the rest of the euro 
zone could be better managed.  IMF criteria were changed in 2010 to allow countries 
“exceptional access” to credit lines, but even Greece failed to meet these new criteria for credit 
access.  But do IMF measures targeted toward the periphery-in-crisis help or harm?  The answer 
requires a step back to assess eurozone balance of payments problems. 
                                                
22Matina Stevis and Ian Talley. “IMF Admits Mistakes on Greece Bailout” in The Wall Street Journal.  5 
June 2013. 
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V. CAUSALITY OF GERMANY’S CURRENT ACCOUNT SURPLUS 
This section draws on two contrasting opinions of experts, each expert serving as a motif 
for two ideological camps which align more or less with the views that either German policy 
created the current account surplus predatorily or that the current account surplus is 
unconnected with German policy.  The two opinions serve as articulations of the two camps 
forming to explain the significance of Germany’s current account surplus, whether the surplus 
has negatively affected eurozone recovery, and what or even if policy can be changed to rectify 
its negative effects.  The difference in opinion can be generally expressed as a disagreement over 
the a) causality of the surplus, and b) whether the surplus is a causal factor in the financial 
imbalances within the eurozone or simply a product of them. 
Niall Ferguson, a Harvard historian who has also written extensively on economics, 
posits the more general assumption that Germany is to blame for the current euro savings glut.  
He writes that the current account surplus is simply an effect of Germans’ low consumption and 
high savings, an opinion shared by perhaps the majority of popular commentators.  But Hans-
Werner Sinn, an economist at the University of Munich, writes a direct retort to Ferguson’s 
blame of Germany.  Sinn writes that Ferguson is off the mark by falsely attributing the causation 
of the current account surplus to low consumption and high savings, when in fact the current 
account surplus is reflective of the greater problem of imbalance of payments.  In Sinn’s view, 
periphery economies proved to investors that they were insecure investments, causing capital to 
fly to the more secure North of Europe and the low-inflation stronghold, Germany.  Sinn is quick 
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to point out other economic indicators show that Germany is far from a so-called ‘winner’ of 
eurozone membership. 
So these two dichotomous viewpoints offer different solutions because of the different 
conceptualizations of the problem.  Looking at the Ferguson argument, if Germany’s current 
account surplus is a result of low consumption and high savings, then the fiscal policies of the 
German government are to blame for at least some portion of the long continuation of the 
instability of the eurozone periphery.  This comes from the assumption that Germany’s high rate 
of exports, which lend a positive number to its current account balance, are not offset enough by 
German consumption of foreign imports.  Consumption of imports is a negative number in the 
current account balance; but because of low rates of consumption of foreign-manufactured 
products, this negative number is much smaller than the positive number representing German 
exports.  So the equation remains positive, thusly called a current account surplus. But this 
balance is seen by those of the Fergusonian line of thinking as being too great of a surplus.  The 
surplus represents capital which could be invested in the periphery economies, or money which 
could have been in the periphery economies since before the crisis if Germans would consume as 
much as they manufactured.  So in the Fergusonian view, the German current account surplus is 
a sort of siphon, removing and hoarding German profits in Germany and not returning them to 
the periphery.  Fergusonians portray Germany a sort of “Euro Winner”, the country which 
benefited most from EMU. 
But directly contrasting this opinion is the view of Hans Werner Sinn.  Writing a 
criticism of Ferguson in The Financial Times called blatantly “It is wrong to portray Germany as 
the euro winner”, Sinn reverses the causality argument.  It was not German policy which caused 
the current account plus, rather the combined influence of policies of the periphery countries 
and the start of the US financial crisis which sent capital flying back to more stable Germany.  
Sinn emphasizes this point about the measure, noting that balance of payments is actually a 
measure of capital flows.  The country with the surplus experiences a boom/influx of capital, 
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wages rise because of it, and therefore products become internationally less competitive thusly 
reducing exports and rebalancing the current account.23   The periphery economies simply 
suffered from cheap access to credit brought along with EMU and are experiencing the pop of a 
bubble.  Investors pulled money out of these countries and invested it into safer Germany.  
Because the two camps differ primarily on the causality of the surplus, policy approaches 
to relieve the persistent capital imbalances across the eurozone differ wildly, especially when 
based on the two starkly contrasted interpretations of the current account surplus.  The 
Fergusonian view calls for actionable policy change, believing that Germany can and should 
change policy to increase domestic consumption in order to correct the current account 
imbalances in the eurozone. 
Those of Sinn’s view believe that Germany cannot effectuate change in eurozone 
imbalance because the current account surplus is a symptom of factors external to Germany and 
therefore no German-specific policy change is needed.  Sinn cites the US financial crisis as the 
trigger for the European debt crisis, which primarily affected member states in the periphery of 
the eurozone.  These periphery member states’ policies are more to blame than Germany’s, and 
Germany’s resilience throughout the Euro Crisis is not reason to assume that its policies are 
predatorial.  In a working paper for the National Bureau of Economic Research, Sinn attributes 
eurozone payments imbalances to the Target international payment system used between 
eurozone member states’ central banks. 24  When adjusted for different account practices used 
by periphery central banks, current account deficits in the periphery can be traced to credit from 
other eurozone countries.  Sinn writes that “while the printing presses in the periphery overheat, 
                                                
23Hans-Werner Sinn. “It is wrong to portray Germany as the euro winner,” in The Financial Times, 22 
July 2013. 
 
24Hans-Werner Sinn and Timo Wollmersshaueser.  “Target Loans, Current Account Balances, and Capital 
Flows: The ECB’s Rescue Facility” Working Paper 17626.  National Bureau of Economic Research.  
November 2011. 
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the printing presses in the core have been converted to money shredders”.25   This emphasizes 
the point that wider access to credit in the periphery was unsustainable.  Governments of the 
periphery as well as private firms benefited from cheap access to credit  when joining the EMU—
cheap credit brought on because of the stability of the currencies and economics of German and 
other Northern European eurozone member states.  Access to such cheap credit created an 
influx in capital, which is evident in hindsight with examples such as the popping of the Irish 
and Spanish housing market bubble collapses.  Sinn writes that once these capital markets 
proved to be unstable, investors retreated and kept their funds in euros in more secure countries 
in Germany and the North of Europe.  Capital flows, in this respect, are important to 
understanding the changing value of current account balances within the eurozone.   
Explanation by Capital Flows 
Bank loans across member state borders are important for equalizing interest rates 
across the EU.  Restrictions on capital movement in Europe have long been liberalized.  A 
German company can easily take out a loan from a French bank as if it were a domestic loan.  
But since the crisis, inter-European lending is at a low point.  Before 2008, funds held by 
foreigners in member state banks had been rising, but totals in Q1-2013 had dropped to mid-
2005 levels.26   In a speech to the European Forum in Alpbach on 9 July 2013, Yves Mersch, 
member of the Executive Board of the ECB, commented “We do not yet have the right powers at 
the European level to support a Single Market in capital”.27   He continued, “When placed under 
stress, financial markets in Europe have renationalized, with negative effects on the Single 
Market in goods and services, as well.”  The renationalization of capital negatively affects the 
current account balance of countries in the periphery, and positively affects eurozone countries 
                                                
25Hans-Werner Sinn and Timo Wollmersshaueser. 2011, p. 17. 
 
26Financial Times, “Bail-in fears grow for big depositors”.  Christopher Thompson and Ralph Atkins.  1 
July 2013. 
 
27Yves Mersch. Speech to the European Forum at Alpbach. 29 August 2013.  Retrieved from the website of 
the European Central Bank. 
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which did not experience such turmoil in their financial markets.  This means that countries 
already in debt crisis experienced a compounded effect because capital was withdrawn from 
these markets, making credit more expensive. 
The circular problems created from this retrenchment of capital out of crisis countries 
when they experience crisis is obvious.  But the outflow of capital from Country A means an 
inflow in Country B.  For country A, this leads to a current account deficit.  Other economic 
indicators for Country A are also negative, including government spending, perhaps GDP 
growth, and others.  Country B, which experiences in inflow of capital which left Country A, 
experiences a current account surplus.  This should not be confused with increased living 
standards, but it can be associated with cheaper capital.  Cheaper capital can create temporary 
booms, leading to increased wages.  But increased wages lead to exports which are less 
competitive on the global market, which decreases Country B’s exports and leads to a current 
account rebalancing.  So the causal relationship between current account and other economic 
indicators can be confused.  A negative current account can stem from economic crises which 
cause a decrease in exports as in the eurozone periphery, but it can also stem from structural 
differences.  The United States and United Kingdom, for example, have higher current account 
deficits than every OECD member, but are huge financial service centers and whose economics 
are less export-oriented, so the measure of current account is less important for such countries. 
Falling Import Prices affecting Current Account 
Another explanation for an increase in German current account surplus is falling prices 
on key imports.  The German Federal Bureau of Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt) notes that 
prices of German imports fell by 2.3% in January 2014 compared to January 2013.28  Falling 
prices of Germany’s main imports also contribute to a surplus in the current account, especially 
when export prices are held constant.  So a portion of Germany’s rising current account surplus 
                                                
28 Statistisches Bundesamt.  D-Statis.  Press release 068, 27 Feburary 2014. 
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comes from the mere fact that the prices of goods imported into Germany are falling on the 
average.  The significance of drops in import prices may be low, but this illustrates the idea of 
incomplete information being used to form new policy decisions because of Germany’s current 
account balance. Rising prices of German exports and falling prices of German imports 
contribute to a current account surplus just as much as a fall in import consumption, or perhaps 
persistent low levels of import consumption as Niall Ferguson suggests.
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VI. 2013 POLICY PARADIGM SHIFT EXPLANATIONS 
One major question to address in such a paper is the timing of such a shift—the ‘why 
now?’ question.  Why did a cohort of institutions, each of which representing creditor and 
debtor countries alike, suddenly in mid 2013 change their prescriptions for handling the crisis?  
The Commission, ECB, and IMF count countries in both the periphery and core of Europe as 
stakeholders, of course to varying degrees.  It can be argued that the ECB and Commission both 
have political mandates to equally represent each country within the European Union, so these 
institutions are much closer to the European debt crisis than the IMF, whose members are not 
exclusively from the EU.  The IMF, on the other hand, is an international institution which 
assigns voting rights by share quotas, i.e. votes are assigned by how much money is contributed 
to the Fund.  Perhaps a larger stakeholder in the IMF could influence policy more so than a 
smaller stakeholder.  Or perhaps a policy shift was always on the table and only came to fruition 
in 2013?  Such questions are explored in this section. 
Policy Shift due to Change in IMF Voting Weights 
The IMF assigns votes based on contributions to the Fund from its members, meaning 
that a country which contributes more money to the Fund and therefore is a larger stakeholder 
gets a larger percentage of votes determining the Funds decisions.  Because of historical reasons, 
a majority of the Fund’s votes are controlled by advanced Western economies, the largest 
shareholder of which is the United States.  Changes in the assignment of voting weight have 
been made regularly throughout the history of the Fund.  But do the most recent changes in 
voting weight account for a change in the Fund’s change in policy toward debtor countries?
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The IMF instituted a voting change, agreed upon in 2008, to readjust the voting weights 
of countries to more accurately reflect the changing global economic landscape in respect to the 
emerging and developing economies.  Looking at an official IMF document summarizing a 
review process of the changes implemented in 2011, entitled “Report of the Executive Board to 
the Board of Governors on the Outcome of the Quota Formula Review”, IMF Board of Governors 
members were split on their opinions regarding the new voting weights, saying that the changes 
were sufficient or insufficient in reflecting the changes in the global economy.29  Voting shares, 
however, did not change drastically due to the 2010 reform.30   A change in IMF decision making 
because of this change in voting weights can be safely ruled out. 
Institutionalist Explanation for the Policy Shift 
The autonomous actorness of the IMF can account for new policies which do not 
conform to the wishes of the IMF’s member states.  The IMF does have agenda setting power, so 
its staff controls which potential decisions the IMF Board of Governors can make simply by 
adding or leaving off a topic from the agenda.  Because of the IMF’s perception of expertise in 
the area, and because it is staffed almost exclusively by highly trained economists, the Fund is 
deferred to regularly on the international stage as having more and better information than 
many other international actors.  Its expertise has moved the IMF to take on new competencies 
during its history for which it did not have the mandate at its founding.  Conditionality and 
technical assistance were the original two tools expressly permitted to the IMF, i.e. creating 
certain standards before a loan could be administered and offering technical advice to member 
states.31   The IMF, however, has expanded from these original competencies and incorporated 
                                                
29“Report of the Executive Board to the Board of Governors on the Outcome of the 2010 Quota Formula 
Review”. International Monetary Fund.  2013. 
 
30“Quota and Voting Shares Before and After Implementation of Reforms Agreed in 2008 and 2010”.  
International Monetary Fund.  2013. 
 
31Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, p. 46. 
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structural reform into its arsenal.  Historian Mike Mazower writes bluntly on the IMF’s 
structural reform competencies, “If borrowing countries could not be trusted to carry out the 
necessary internal adjustment by themselves, the IMF would tell them how.”32   He continues, 
calling the IMF the “cruel doctor of fiscal health” as it became “not merely a funder but an 
engineer of domestic policy changes”.  The IMF slashed public spending, set targets for fiscal 
and monetary policy in borrowing countries, and embarked on neoliberal policies such as lower 
tariffs and fewer capital controls.  Barnett and Finnemore also write that the IMF promoted the 
Washington Consensus of neoliberal economic policy. 33  The IMF clearly pursued its own policy 
agenda with tools it added on its own to its portfolio of domestic policy-influencing tools. 
Does the institutionalist view of seeing the IMF as an autonomous actor explain the 2013 
policy paradigm shift?  It explains quite well the development of the policy paradigm before the 
crisis, but it does not lead to a justification of why the policy paradigm shift occurred.  It can be 
argued that a policy paradigm shift occurred in IMF economists’ thinking, but there is no 
evidence of this and can only be speculated.  After several years of an ongoing eurozone financial 
crisis, the IMF could have decided to break with its policy paradigm of debtor-side-only burden 
with a policy of burden sharing between debtor and creditor countries.  Peter Hall writes that 
such policy changes do not come from nowhere, rather that these ideas exist in the institution 
and are brought up because of changing factors not only outside of the institution but also from 
within.34   The changing factors which could be the impetus for the IMF policy paradigm shift 
are the  
1) longer-than-expected duration of the crisis as well as  
2) the unprecedented level of debtor countries located in Europe.   
                                                
32Mazower, Mark.  Governing the World: The History of an Idea.  Penguin Books, 2012. ebook, Ch. “The 
Real New International Economic Order”. 
 
33 Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, p. 46. 
 
34Hall, 1993, p. 283-4. 
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Traditionally, the IMF’s core of creditor countries were located in the Western world and its 
debtor countries in the developing world.  This dichotomy was shuffled, perhaps causing some 
IMF economists to critically assess the policy paradigm of assigning burden to only the debtor 
countries.  In terms of current account, assigning blame and burden to only one side of the 
balance of payments mirror can be shortsighted.  
Barnett and Finnemore write on this mirror image of balance of payments in their 2004 
book to show the problem on focusing on solely debtor countries: 
There are other ways of conceptualizing balance of payments issues that locate cause and 
solution differently, and therefore create different foci for policy and different intellectual 
justification for assigning the burden of adjustment.  For example, in theory every deficit 
has a mirror surplus somewhere in the system.  Analysis of these relationships would 
entail construction of systemic models of payments rather than country-by-country 
models.  Such a framework would suggest some different methods for managing 
payments imbalances, notably inducing adjustments in surplus states.  In the Fund’s 
intellectual and policy framework, adjustment is compulsory only for deficit countries; 
for surplus states it is voluntary.  Theoretically, one obvious direction that the Fund’s 
work could have taken would have been to expand Fund influence over surplus states in 
some way as a means of promoting systemic adjustment. 35 
 
The mirror image of the balance of payments problem was not historically accounted for by the 
IMF.  Countries in need of assistance applied for loans, and these loans were the policy tool of 
the IMF to set its terms of conditionality and structural reform.  Creditor countries did not apply 
for loans and therefore were immune to the IMF’s policy tools.   
Summarizing, the IMF, an international institution, went beyond its original mandate by 
adding new competencies to its portfolio of available policy tools while also undertaking a 
distinct agenda of its own.  Its method of funding itself through interest rates on loans to 
member states as well as its agenda setting ability for the IMF Board of Governors overseers led 
to its increasing autonomy and actorness-capability.  But attributing the 2013 policy paradigm 
shift to the IMF as an autonomous actor cannot be done with certainty because of the 
speculation to what happens in the IMF behind closed doors.  The paper now attempts to 
                                                
35Barnett and Finnemore, 2004, p. 55. 
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explain the policy change through the possible factors, first looking at the state-centric realist 
explanation. 
Realist Explanation of the Paradigm Shift 
The conceptualization of international institutions as policy avenues or arenas for state 
actors is considered as the mainstream in political science; institutional actorness is rather new 
in comparison.  But ruling out the influence of the IMF’s member states in the Fund’s decisions 
making process is shortsighted.  IMF decisions are still taken by a Managing Director, chosen by 
a Board of Governors representing the member states which meets a handful of times per year.  
Although the case for the historical autonomy of the IMF has been laid out in this paper, state 
influence cannot be entirely discounted.  Even after voting reallocations previously discussed, 
post-industrial economies remained the primary stakeholders in the IMF, the largest of which is 
the United States. 
Has the IMF been used as a policy avenue or even a policy microphone by its majority 
stakeholders?  The case for state influence in the IMF is as strong as its autonomous actorness.  
As previously discussed, the IMF promoted the Washington Consensus of neoliberal economic 
reforms in its conditionality and structural programs—policies championed by the United 
States, the IMF’s largest stakeholder.  Quoting a Republican senator, Mark Mazower quips “If 
the United States were to embark on a very heavy-handed effort to try to change domestic 
policies within recipient countries, we would be viewed as the ugly American. But when the 
international community as a whole does so, then I think real changes can be put into place, and 
that is what is needed in a lot of those countries.” 36 Mazower adds that the “IMF had a better 
chance of persuading South American or East Asian governments to push through unpopular 
political domestic reforms than the U.S. Treasury”.37  The potential use of the IMF as a policy 
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avenue of the United States is evident.  But this alone does not prove policy coordination 
between the Fund and the United States government.   
The timing of policy shifts by the United States and subsequent policy paradigm shift by 
the IMF should not be seen as entirely coincidental.  The United States Treasury released its 
“Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies” on 30 October 
2013.  In the report, the Treasury places a burden of action on countries “with large and 
persistent surpluses” as needing to “take action to boost domestic demand growth and shrink 
their surpluses”.38   The Treasury report singles out Germany as having a nominal current 
account surplus larger than that of China, calling German domestic demand growth “anemic” 
and that German dependence on exports has “hampered rebalancing at a time when other euro-
area countries have been under severe pressure to curb demand and compress imports in order 
to promote adjustment.”  The report also blames Germany for a deflationary bias for the 
eurozone as well as the global economy. 
The day following the release of the 30 October U.S. Treasury Report, IMF First Deputy 
Managing Director David Lipton spoke in Berlin regarding Germany’s role in the world.  Lipton 
also agreed with the U.S. Treasury report saying that a “significantly smaller current account 
would be useful”.39   The timing of such a radical policy shift surely had been coordinated at 
some level among U.S. Treasury and IMF staff, if not among top managing directors.
                                                
38“Report to Congress on International Economic and Exchange Rate Policies”.  United States 
Department of the Treasury, Office of Internal Affairs.  Report dated 30 October 2013. 
 
39David Lipton.  Speech entitled “Transitions in an Interconnected World and Germany’s Role” at the 
American Academy in Berlin, Berlin, 31 October 2013. 
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VII. GERMANY’S CURRENT ACCOUNT HYPE 
The criticisms of Germany’s fiscal policy cited the country’s growing current account 
surplus as a problem in the balance of payments between eurozone member states.  Germany’s 
current account was by far the greatest in Europe, far higher than the Netherlands, which had 
the second greatest current account surplus when looking at OECD data from 2012.40  Norway, 
Switzerland, and Sweden followed; all of these countries belonging to the North of Europe, or 
the ‘Core’ in the Core-Periphery dichotomy of the eurozone.  But when controlled for these 
countries population sizes, Germany no longer takes the top position.  Dividing current account 
balances for each of the OECD member countries by their populations controls for differences in 
GDP per capita.  This measure gives in effect the average current account surplus or deficit per 
capita.  By this view, Germany comes in 6th on the list (see Figure 1, p. 28).  This measure does 
not necessarily mean that the average citizen of each country saves the amount listed in the 
chart, rather it is a figure best used for comparison.  Norway has the highest per person 
contribution to the current account balance, followed by Switzerland, the Netherlands, 
Luxembourg, and Sweden.  Norway’s current account surplus can be explained because of its 
hydrocarbon exports.  The current account surpluses of Switzerland and Luxembourg come 
mostly from their large financial sectors.  These countries are all located in the North of Europe, 
have populations much smaller than Germany’s, but also have higher current account surpluses 
relative to GDP per capita.  So why is Germany the target of international condemnation for its 
current account surplus?  Because it is the biggest.
                                                
40Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Data on current account and balance of 
payments.  OECD StatExtracts / iLibrary.  Updated to Q2-2013. 
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    *Population figures for Switzerland from 2011  
 
Germany received international scorn for its current account surplus because it has the 
largest population, largest economy, and promotes export-led growth and low domestic 
consumption.  Looking at total current account surpluses for the five countries ranking above 
Germany in the calculation, the sums of their current account surplus are nearly equal to 
Figure 1: Countries Sorted by Current Account per Capita 
Country CA 2012 in $ 
Population  
2012 
CA as % 
GDP 
CA per Capita in 
$ 
Norway 71,863,000 5,019,000 21.652% 14,318.19 
Switzerland 70,240,000 *7,912,398 16.512% 8,877.21 
Luxembourg 3,802,000 530,946 8.004% 7,160.80 
Netherlands 72,582,000 16,754,960 9.996% 4,331.97 
Sweden 31,384,000 9,519,374 7.690% 3,296.86 
Germany 243,419,000 81,913,000 7.088% 2,971.68 
Ireland 9,307,000 4,585,900 4.628% 2,029.48 
Slovak 
Republic 4,357,000 5,407,579 3.119% 805.72 
Austria 6,295,000 8,429,990 1.693% 746.74 
Slovenia 1,455,000 2,056,262 2.483% 707.59 
Hungary 1,142,000 9,919,000 0.509% 115.13 
Italy -11,285,000 60,514,850 -0.543% -186.48 
Estonia -411,000 1,329,301 -1.265% -309.19 
Portugal -3,325,000 10,514,840 -1.218% -316.22 
Spain -14,914,000 46,163,120 -0.993% -323.07 
Czech 
Republic -4,754,000 10,509,290 -1.643% -452.36 
Poland -18,245,000 38,534,000 -2.078% -473.48 
Greece -6,095,000 11,092,770 -2.110% -549.46 
Finland -4,429,000 5,413,971 -2.087% -818.07 
France -57,778,000 63,556,190 -2.391% -909.09 
Belgium -10,566,000 11,128,250 -2.341% -949.48 
United States -440,417,000 313,914,000 -2.711% -1,402.99 
United 
Kingdom -94,867,000 63,705,000 -4.175% -1,489.16 
Iceland -748,000 320,716 -5.984% -2,332.28 
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Germany’s current account surplus on its own.  This means that a potential policy change by the 
German government alone could affect 50% of the current account surpluses of the top six 
eurozone surplus countries.  Even though it contributes per person a lower degree to the overall 
current account surplus of the North, the German government’s policy affects the eurozone’s 
largest economy and the largest share of the North’s current account surplus.  Any European-
level policy changes made to address persistent eurozone imbalance of payments would also 
disproportionately affect Germany mores so than the other, smaller countries in the North.
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Germany's current account surplus triggered a paradigm shift in institutional response to 
the persistent imbalance of payments problem during the eurozone crisis.  The IMF shifted away 
from placing the burden of financial rebalancing solely on debtor countries and moved toward a 
more equal policy of assigning at least partial blame to creditor countries.  Although the IMF has 
gained much autonomy from its member states since its inception, the impetus for the policy 
paradigm shift is likely to have come from the United States.  This paper found that a mix of 
institutionalist and realist theory was needed to assess the IMF’s policy paradigm shift to garner 
a well-rounded understanding of the IMF as an autonomous international institutions which 
does not depend on state contributions for its yearly budget, but also the realist understanding 
of the IMF as an intra-state fund with state-actors as stakeholders.  The timing of the US 
Treasury report citing German current account surplus as a persistent threat to eurozone 
payments rebalancing and economic recovery was followed soon after by the IMF’s own 
admission that its pro-creditor policies were in need of reevaluation. 
While ideas for a more equal approach toward debtor and creditor countries had most 
likely always been in IMF staff discussions, this prompting by the United States Treasury, 
dissatisfaction with the longer-than-expected duration of the eurozone crisis, as well as the 
unprecedented number of debtor countries in Europe led the IMF to enact new policies which 
were a shift in its policy paradigm.  This policy change broke with the IMF’s traditional policy 
paradigm of debtor-burden only in terms of balance of payments problems.  But this leaves still 
the open question of how the IMF or other institutions can influence German economic policies 
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when the German government is not in need of IMF loans and the conditionality they bring with 
them.  An exploration into other international institutions’ attempts to influence German 
economic policy could also be undertaken in the future, namely exploring the EU-Germany 
nexus in respect to economic policy, but such a relationship is also one-sided due to the strength 
of Germany within the EU in terms of economics as well as voting rights.  
In regards to the targeting of blame on Germany for its current account surplus, this 
paper found that such targeting is unfair because of the higher share of current account surplus 
per capita in other, albeit smaller, countries in the North of Europe.  While it is the most 
pragmatic to focus policy criticism on the country with the largest current account surplus, other 
Northern European countries can also enact policies to join Germany in boosting domestic 
demand growth in order to alleviate the eurozone balance of payments problem.  But the policy 
tools of the IMF are also incapable of structurally reforming these creditor countries because of 
the absence of their need for IMF loans.  Whether the current account surplus is a measure that 
can be actively changed is also debatable, as scholars and economists continue to argue about 
the cause of Germany’s current account surplus and whether the German government should or 
even can enact a new unilateral policy to rebalance payments in the eurozone. 
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